doctrine, will set aside any representation election in which the winning party intentionally or unintentionally makes an assertion of fact or law that "involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time which prevents the other party or parties from making an effective reply... [and which] may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the election." 2 Despite scholarly criticism,' and expressions of misgivings by Board members themselves,' the Board has applied the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine frequently to set aside elections in which employers or unions have made inaccurate or misleading statements.
For example, in one case the Board set aside an election where an employer claimed that the union on other occasions had bargained away existing benefits. Because the employer failed to mention that the union had negotiated new benefits in their stead, these statements were found to create a false impression preventing the exercise of free choice.' In another case, the employer distributed a weekly paycheck reduced by the amount of union dues, which was paid separately. This tactic was thought to give the erroneous impression that union dues would be deducted weekly instead of monthly. 6 By far the greatest number of cases in which elections have been set aside under Hollywood Ceramics have involved inaccurate or misleading union statements concerning wages or benefits obtained elsewhere. 7 While the Board has held unions to a high standard of accuracy, the courts have been even more rigorous where union statements are concerned. The Fifth Circuit's statement that "assertions concerning wages . .. are... the selfsame subjects concerning which men organize and elect their representatives to bargain" ' has been widely cited with approval
The Hollywood Ceramics doctrine, in common with other Board rules governing campaign tactics, 1 " is based on the Board's desire to protect employee freedom of choice. As the Board explained in Hollywood Ceramics, "where employees cast their ballots upon the basis of a material misrepresentation, such vote cannot reflect their uninhibited desires, and they have not exercised the kind of choice envisaged by the Act." 11 Implicit in the Board's rules governing misrepresentations, as well as in other rules intended to protect employees' free choice, are two assumptions about employees' behavior in representation elections: (i) employees attend closely to the preelection campaign; (2) employees' voting predispositions prior to the campaign are tenuous and easily changed by information acquired during the campaign. (1966) , in which reproducing a portion of an NLRB complaint in such a way as to give the impression that the employer had authoritatively been found to have committed the acts charged was held to violate Hollywood Ceramics. 7. See, e.g., Zarn, Inc., 17o Rav. 1465 Rav. , 1465 Rav. n.4 (1975 [hereinafter referred to as Part I]. These rules regulate many aspects of union and employer speech and activity during the period preceding a NLRB representation election. See generally Part I, supra. The model of "laboratory conditions" which the Board attempts to achieve in representation elections stands in sharp contrast to the lack of regulation in political campaigns. See id. at 1469-70, 1488-90.
MI. 14 o N.L.R.B. at 223. x2. The assumption that voting intention is tenuous is obviously related to and partially founded upon the assumption that employees are unsophisticated about labor relations. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 185 N.L.R.B. 262 (1970) , discussed in text at note 5 supra.
We recently tested these and other Board assumptions 8 in an empirical study designed to determine the effect of union and employer campaigning on employees' predispositions to vote for or against union representation. As the findings that follow demonstrate, our data about employees' voting behavior are inconsistent with the assumptions underlying the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine. 1 
A. Selecting Elections for Study
Since we wanted to test the effect of the campaign on voting behavior, the primary consideration in selecting elections to study was the likelihood of vigorous campaigning. In order to maximize the generalizability of our findings, we also sought to include a variety of businesses, unions, unit sizes, and communities.
We were quite successful in identifying elections in which there was vigorous campaigning by both parties. In 28 of the 3 elections studied, at least one party engaged in substantial campaigning by distributing written materials, holding meetings and personally contacting employees. In 2o elections, both parties campaigned vigorously. Unlawful campaigning occurred in 22 elections2O
13. Other assumptions underlying Board rules indude the following: (i) that employees will interpret ambiguous statements by the employer as threats or promises; (2) that employees are unsophisticated about labor relations; (3) that employees are easily swayed by their employer's economic power over them, and in particular, that threats of reprisal and promises of benefits are likely to coerce employees; and (4) that limited union campaigning on company premises is adequate to reach employees. These and other assumptions are discussed in detail in Part I, supra note so, at 1470--82.
14. The authors' study examined other Board rules and assumptions governing representation campaigns than those involved in Hollywood Ceramics. See note 13 supra; note 58 infra. The full report of this study will soon be forthcoming. See note * supra. Stanford Law Review will publish a series of commentaries on this full report in Volume 28.
15. The pretest results and research design are set out in detail in Getman, Goldberg & Herman, The National Labor Relations Board Voting Study: A Preliminary Report, i J. LEG. Stmu. 233 (1972) .
16. The following procedure was used in determining whether or not unlawful campaigning took place. If unfair labor practice charges or objections to the election were filed and ruled upon, the official disposition of those charges was treated as determinative of the legality of the conduct involved. At times, however, charges or objections were not filed even though conduct had occurred that was arguably or even dearly unlawful. The losing party was sometimes unaware of the conduct in question or its unlawfulness, or, if the election was lost by a wide margin, uninterested in the possibility of obtaining a rerun election or even a bargaining order. Additionally, no winning party ever protested the loser's election practices, presumably since the only remedy in such a case would be a cease and desist order of little practical value.
When charges were not filed, we made a preliminary determination, based upon the campaign materials and what the parties told us, as to whether conduct had occurred that was arguably un-The 3 elections involved firms representing a broad range of business operations. Employers in i8 elections were involved in some type of manufacturing operation. The other businesses studied included three automobile dealerships, two retail stores, two health care facilities, one motel, one multiple-line insurance company, one manufacturer and distributor of food products, and one trucking company.
We studied elections in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, and Kentucky. They were located in communities ranging in size from Chicago and St. Louis to Chatsworth, Illinois (pop. 1,255), and Morgantown, Kentucky (pop. 1, 394) . The number of voters in the units studied ranged from four to just under 4oo.
B. Structuring Employee Interviews
If the unit size was under 25, all employees were interviewed. In units of more than 25, we interviewed a randomly selected one-third sample, with a minimum sample size of 25 and a maximum of ioo. All employees in the sample were interviewed twice." The wave I interview took place as soon as possible after the election date was set." The wave II interview occurred immediately after the election."
The vast majority of the employees contacted were willing to be interviewed. The average refusal rate at wave I was 6 percent; at wave II it was 5 percent. The overall noncompletion rate, which includes employees who could not be contacted as well as those who refused to be interviewed, was 14 percent at wave I, 7 percent at wave II. The few employees who could not be contacted or refused to be interviewed did not bias the sample. The proportion of pro-union voters in the total across-election sample was precisely the same (45 percent) as the proportion of pro-union voters in the total across-election population.
lawful. All arguably unlawful speech and conduct not passed upon by the Board was submitted to Melvin J. Welles, Administrative Law Judge, NLRB, who had agreed to decide, on an unofficial basis, whether material was either unlawful or grounds on whch valid objections might be based. Conduct taking place during the campaign was coded as illegal or objectionable only on the basis of a decision by the Board or an administrative law judge in official Board proceedings, or on a finding by Judge Weles.
17. This research design (interviewing the same subjects several times over a given period) is typically used to study voting behavior in political elections. See, e.g., B. BERatsox, P. i8. The initial research design contemplated interviewing the voters three times before the election rather than once. This approach was dropped after the first pretest, see note 15 supra, primarily because the campaigns were compressed into such a brief period that repeated questioning as to campaign content elicited too little additional information to warrant the cost of frequent interviews. For this reason, we decided to ask about campaign content only during the wave II interviews. See note i9 in/ra and accompanying text.
ig. See note 17 supra. For more exact data on the interval between the election and the wave II interview, see note 47 infra.
2o. The sample results differed significantly from the election results in only two individual
In the wave I interview employees were asked a series of questions designed to determine their attitudes toward working conditions and unions in general. On the basis of their responses, we constructed separate job satisfaction 2 and union attitude' 5 indexes for each employee. Employees were also asked whether or not they had signed a union authorization card and how they planned to vote.
In the wave II interview, employees were asked how they had voted and why. They were also asked to report as much as they could remember about the content of the campaign. Closed-end screening questions were used to determine if the employee had been exposed to a particular type of campaigning (for example, "Did you, at any time before the election, get any letters or other written material from the Company discussing the Union or the election?"). Those employees who answered "yes" were then asked for their recollection of the campaign message ("What did they say?").
C. Measuring Employees' Recall of Campaign Issues
In order to determine the actual content of the employer and union campaigns, we interviewed the organizer in charge of the union's campaign and the person in charge of the employer's campaign, normally the personnel manager or labor relations attorney. We asked for copies of all written materials used in the campaign, transcripts of all speeches and a report of what was said in the speeches and meetings for which transcripts were not available. Additionally, each party was questioned about the issues raised in personal efforts to persuade employees to vote for or against the union.
During the pretest studies we developed content categories for coding elections. In one of those elections there was a 6-month delay between wave I and the election due to an appeal from the Regional Director's direction of election. Substantial turnover during that period reduced the sample size from 44 employees to 31 employees. 21. Responses to the following eight questions were used to compute the job satisfaction index: (i) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with your wages? (2) Do supervisors in this company play favorites or do they treat all employees alike? (3) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the type of work you are doing? (4) Do your supervisors show appreciation when you do a good job or do they just take it for granted? (5) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with your fringe benefits, such as pensions, vacations, holiday pay, insurance, and sick leave? (6) Do you think there is a good chance or not much chance for you to get promotion in this company? (7) Are you satisfied or not satisfied with the job security at this company? (8) Taking everything into consideration, would you say that you are satisfied or not satisfied with this company as a place to work?
22. Responses to the following eight questions were used to compute the union attitude index: (X) Unions are becoming too strong. Do you agree or disagree? (2) Unions make sure that employees are treated fairly by supervisors. Do you agree or disagree? (3) Unions help working men and women to get better wages and hours. Do you agree or disagree? (4) Unions interfere with good relations between companies and workers. Do you agree or disagree? (5) Union dues are too high. Do you agree or disagree? (6) When a strike is called, it is generally for a good reason. Do you agree or disagree? (7) Unions are a major cause of high prices. Do you agree or disagree? (8) Taking everything into consideration, would you describe your overall attitude toward unions as favorable or not favorable? campaign issues. This code allowed us to classify the issues raised in each election so that we could compare employees' familiarity with similar issues across elections.
After the campaign materials were read and coded, a profile of each party's campaign was constructed. The person who coded the campaign would then read and code the responses of the employees interviewed in that election. Employee responses were compared to the profile to determine how familiar each employee was with the issues raised in that campaign. An employee's union familiarity index (UFI) recorded the proportion of issues in the union campaign profile that he mentioned in his wave II interview. The company familiarity index (CFI) was similarly constructed.
It is possible that the coders' knowledge of the actual campaign issues before reading the employees' responses built in a bias favoring the coding of an employee's response as recognition of a campaign issue. We chose to run that risk, however, rather than possibly understate campaign familiarity. We also sought to avoid understating campaign familiarity by making it unnecessary for an employee to report any details of a campaign issue in order to be credited with having recalled that issue. For example, one employee answered questions asked about the content of a union letter as follows:
Said they'd make it better (x) pay (x) stop bosses playing favorites (x) retirement plan (x) don't know, just get us one (x) that all.
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This answer was coded as recalling the union's claims that it would improve wages, obtain a retirement plan and prevent supervisors from treating employees unfairly. While the employee furnished no details about the union's claims, he did remember the issues that had been raised.
It was conceivable that the wave I interviews, which occurred prior to the campaign, might sensitize employees to the issues of the campaign or influence their voting behavior. While costs prohibited using control groups in every election, they were used in two elections. The employees in those elections were divided randomly into two groups. Employees in the control group were interviewed only after the election, while those in the regular sample were interviewed according to the normal 2-wave procedure. There were no significant differences in campaign familiarity or vote between the two groups. The evidence thus suggests that the wave I interviews neither increased employees' sensitivity to the preelection campaign nor affected their vote.
II. THiE ASSUMPTION THAT EMPLOYES' PRECAMPAIGN VOTING PREDISPOSITIONS ARE TENUOUS
If the Board is correct in assuming that employees' precampaign voting predispositions are tenuous and easily changed by the campaign, then it would follow that neither intent nor attitudes formed prior to the campaign would be highly related to vote. On the other hand, if campaigning does not influence employees to vote contrary to their predispositions, then precampaign attitudes and intent should predict vote. To test these contrary hypotheses, we measured attitudes and intent in the wave I interview prior to the campaign and then compared these data with the individual employee's actual voting pattern.
A. Predicting Vote from Attitudes
To determine the extent to which attitudes predict vote, we asked questions during the precampaign wave I interviews designed to measure employees' attitudes toward working conditions (job satisfaction) and toward unions. Employees' responses were indexed and then compared with their actual vote following the campaign.
I. Attitudes toward working conditions.
Job satisfaction questions focused on the working conditions most likely to be affected by unionization. Items that correlated" highly with vote in the pretest studies" were used. Eight questions concerning working conditions were asked in the preelection interview, seven of which dealt with specific conditions. 6 Items were scored on a 3-point, equal-interval scale: "satisfied," "don't know" or "uncertain," and "dissatisfied. ' ""T An employee's responses to the eight items were summed to form an index ranging from 24 to 8 to measure his satisfaction with working conditions. 8 The reliability 9 of the index (r --.78) indicates that the items tested mea-24. A correlation is a statistical measure of the degree of association between two variables (here, between attitudes and actual vote of a sample of employees). It ranges from i (indicating a perfect positive correspondence) through o (indicating no correspondence) to -z (indicating a perfect negative or inverse relationship, meaning that high scores on one variable correspond to low scores on the other). 26. See note 21 supra. 27. Fewer than z% of the sample failed to answer any single job satisfaction question. No pattern of refusals emerged, and no employee failed to answer more than two of the eight questions. Missing responses were scored as "uncertain" or "don't know" so that attitude indexes could be constructed for all employees who participated in both interviews. This is a customary method of treating random missing data, since it is nonbiasing.
28. Individual items were scored 3 (satisfied), 2 (uncertain), or x (dissatisfied). Since there were eight individual items, an employee's overall job satisfaction index could have ranged from 24 to 8 (the higher the index, the greater the job satisfaction).
29. As used here, "reliability" indicates the degree to which the questions measure a single psy-sure a common psychological concept-satisfaction with working conditions. This degree of internal consistency among the items justified using them together as an index. Our data revealed a significant" 0 correlation between satisfaction with working conditions and vote (r = -. 53). Those employees who were satisfied with working conditions were most likely to vote against union representation; those dissatisfied with working conditions tended to support the union. Figure i shows the proportion of the sample voting pro-union at each Job Satisfaction Index chological concept (e.g., satisfaction with working conditions). There are several methods of estimating reliability. The one used here was based on a maximum likelihood estimate of unidimensional common variance among items. 30. "Significance" indicates the likelihood that the result found by analyzing the sample data represents a nonrandom relationship in the population. We use the .oi level of significance at all times. By stating that the correlation between satisfaction and vote (r =--. 53) is significant at the .o level, we can be 99% confident that the actual relationship in the population is not zero. With a very large sample such as the one in this study, even low correlations will be significantly different from zero.
A more meaningful question is the power of the relationship. The power of a correlation is its square, which indicates the proportion of the variance of one variable that can be accounted for by ,the other. A correlation of .io is significant at the .oi level if the sample is greater than i,ooo, but it may not be very meaningful because it shows that the two variables have only x% of their variance in common.
level of satisfaction. Employees with a satisfaction score below i8 voted 3 to i (303 to 99) for union representation; those who scored i8 or above voted 3 to 1 (453 to i49) against union representation. Knowing whether an employee's satisfaction score is greater or less than 18 thus enables one to predict his final vote with 75 percent accuracy.
Attitudes toward unions.
Since we did not assume that employees had any first-hand experience with any union, 8 much less with the one that was a party to the election, the union attitude questions" 2 focused on employees' feelings about unions in general and not on the specific union involved in the election. Interviewers were instructed to assure employees that their responses did not have to be based on personal experience.
Union attitudes were measured on a 3 -point scale of "agree," "don't know" or "uncertain," and "disagree." The item analysis of the pretest data 33 indicated that employees who answered "uncertain" or "don't know" to questions about unions were more likely to vote against the union than for it. On the basis of these pretest results, we scored "uncertain" or "don't know" responses as slightly unfavorable instead of neutral."
The union attitude indexes, like the job satisfaction indexes, were highly reliable (r = .8i). Employee responses to the union attitude items were, for the most part, internally consistent, indicating that combining the items to form an index was justified.
The correlation between union attitudes and vote was .62. Favorable attitudes toward unions in general create strong predispositions to vote for union representation. Figure 2 shows that the percentage of employees voting for union representation increases at each level of greater favorability toward unions. Union attitude indexes ranged from a low score of 8 to a high score of 32." The average pro-union voter's score was 26; the average pro-company voter's score was 15. Figure 2 shows that employees who had a union attitude index of 22 or higher favored union representation by approximately 3 to 1 (381 to 138); those with an index below 22 opposed union representation by more than 5 to I (414 to 7). Thus, knowing whether an employee's union attitude score is greater or less than 22 enables one to predict his vote with 79 percent accuracy.
3. Actually, 43% of the study's respondents had previously been union members elsewhere and 30% had voted in previous NLRB elections. 
Combined attitude indexes.
Whether or not an employee favors union representation in dealing with his employer is likely to be a function of his views as to the desirability of union representation in general and of his satisfaction with his current working conditions. The union attitude and job satisfaction indexes were designed to measure the contribution of each type of predisposition to the vote decision.
In order to utilize both measures of predispositions, the union attitude and job satisfaction indexes were combined in a multiple linear regression equation. " Table i demonstrates that the cross-validated correlation predicting vote from the two attitude indexes was . 6 7 Y" Employee attitudes, 36. Multiple regression is a procedure for determining the maximum linear relationship between a criterion (here, vote) and a combination of predictors (here, job satisfaction and union attitudes). See M. TATSUOKA, VALIDATION STUDIES, SELECTED Topics IN ADvANCED STATISTICS No. 5 (1969) .
37. Because a multiple correlation is based on the particular characteristics of a sample, it is an overestimate of the relationship between predictor and criterion variables in the population from which the sample is drawn. In order to estimate the relationship in the relevant populations (voters in these 31 elections and voters in union representation elections generally), the following standard procedure was used. The sample within each election was randomly split into two groups. The intraelection groups were used to form two across-election subsamples. As shown in Table x , each group was analyzed separately. The predictor weights from each subsample were then applied to the other to determine the cross-validated multiple correlation. measured prior to intense preelection campaigning, thus form strong and stable predispositions to vote for or against union representation. As shown in Table 2 , the attitudes of 83 percent of the pro-company voters and 78 percent of the pro-union voters correctly predicted their individual votes. 3" Overall, we could correctly predict 81 percent of the employees' votes from their precampaign attitudes.!'
B. Predicting Vote from Precampaign Intent
In the wave I interviews, employees were asked whether they intended to vote for or against union representation. Intent was the single best pre- 38. The regression equation was used to predict how each individual employee would vote. The prediction was based on a Bayesian estimate of the likelihood that each employee was a pro-union or pro-company voter in view of his attitudes, the average pro-union and pro-company voter's attitudes and the actual proportion of pro-union and pro-company voters in the sample. dictor of vote (r = .73). Table 3 shows that 94 percent of the employees intending to vote for the company did so, as did 82 percent of those intending to vote for the union. Of the 905 employees who reported a firm intent for or against the union, 87 percent voted in accordance with that intent. By using intent to predict vote, we correctly predicted the outcome of 29 of 3 elections. 4 " Intent is highly related to attitudes. The cross-validated multiple correlation between union attitudes, job satisfaction, and intent was .75, as shown by Table 4 . Employees whose job satisfaction was low relative to others in their unit and who at the same time had favorable attitudes toward unions usually intended to vote for union representation. Similarly, most employees who were satisfied with working conditions and generally unfavorable toward unions at no time intended to vote for union representation. The .67 correlation between attitudes and vote 4 indicates that to a large extent employees acted on their attitudes.
The powerful correlation between attitudes and vote, as well as that between intent and vote, is contrary to the Board's assumption that precampaign intent is tenuous and easily altered by the campaign. The relationship between predispositions and vote is not only powerful, but broadly general. Attitudes and intent successfully predicted vote in midwestern farm communities, urban ghettos and rural Kentucky towns; among employees working in factories, warehouses, retail stores, nursing homes and offices; and in units ranging from 4 to nearly 400 employees. Attitudes and intent predicted vote for males and females; for whites, blacks and Spanishspeaking; for old and young; and for well and poorly educated. They predicted vote when local unemployment was 2 percent and when it was io percent. There is no reason to suppose that a similarly powerful relation4o. Attitudes also predicted the outcome of all but two elections. However, the elections which intent failed to predict were different from the elections attitudes failed to predict. 
C. Accounting for Other Factors
It is possible that employee predispositions to vote for or against union representation were stimulated, fixed or changed by campaigning that occurred prior to the wave I interview.' In order to test this hypothesis, we divided the elections into two groups: those in which neither party conducted a substantial campaign ' prior to wave I interviews and those in which one or both did so. Table 5 shows that preinterview campaigning did not affect the relationship between predispositions and vote. Voting was as predictable when there had been no substantial campaigning prior to wave I as when there had been campaigning. Thus, there is no evidence that pre-wave I campaigning had the effect of fixing attitudes or intent.
Predispositions failed to predict vote accurately for 19 percent of the employees interviewed. Neither demographic nor job experience characteristics distinguished the "errors" (voting predictions based on attitudes) 42. Extensive union campaigning often occurs during the collection of union authorization cards before the Board directs an election (and therefore before the wave I interviews in this study).
43. A substantial campaign for purposes of this analysis was defined as one in which at least one meeting was conducted.
44. This percentage is appropriate for both the attitude-and intent-based predictions. Attitude data were available on all employees, but some employees were undecided at wave I or refused to answer the intent question. Because the two predispositional measures were so highly correlated (r = .75), those employees who were switchers (their intent did not correctly predict their vote) were also likely to be prediction errors (their attitudes did not correctly predict their vote). There was no gain in vote predictability by adding intent to attitudes in the multiple regression equation since most of the switchers were still erroneously classified. Using attitudes alone in the regression equation resulted in a lower level of prediction, but not all switchers were prediction errors, so that a somewhat different and larger group of employees, the prediction errors, was identified.
January 1976] Six elections had no substantial campaigning prior to the wave I interview. Two elections could not be classified since we were unable to determine the extent of pre-wave I campaigning. They were excluded from this analysis.
bZ is the test for the difference between correlations in two independent samples. Z must be greater than 2.33 to be significant at the .01 level.
or "switchers" (voting predictions based on intent) from those who voted in accord with their precampaign attitudes or intent. Switchers and errors who voted pro-company resembled other pro-company voters; those who voted pro-union resembled other pro-union voters.
III. TmH AsSUMPTION THAT EMPLOYEES ATTEND CLOSELY

TO THE CAMPAIGN
To assess the extent to which employees were attentive to the campaign (and therefore possibly influenced by it), we measured the employees'familiarity both with the campaign in general and with particular issues during the postelection wave II interviews. As explained above, we did this by comparing the issues reported by each employee as having been raised in the campaign with the actual campaign issues appearing in written materials, speeches, and personal contacts. 
A. Employees' Familiarity with the Campaign in General
When asked to recall what the employer had said in letters, meetings or personal contacts, most employees could recall only io percent of the company campaign issues (CFI = 9.60). When asked the same questions about the union campaign, employees on the average reported approximately 7 percent of the issues (UFI -7.44) ." This low level of familiarity with the campaigns of both parties contradicts the Board's assumption that employees are attentive to the campaign. Either the employees largely ignored the campaign or they quickly forgot the issues. In either event, they cannot be described as having been attentive to the campaign."
B. Employees' Familiarity with Particular Campaign Issues
r. Company campaign issues (CFI).
One might anticipate that even if most employees recalled comparatively few issues, nearly all employees would recall the issues that were central to the campaign. This was not the case 8 Table 6 shows that no company issue was reported by more than 40 percent of the employees in the elections in which it was raised; only six company issues were reported by 30 percent or more of the employees. 9
Union campaign issues (UFI).
As Table 7 demonstrates, the union's campaign claims that it would improve wages (issue i) and that it would prevent unfairness (issue 2) were recalled by many more employees (71 percent and 64 percent respectively) than any company theme. However, the frequency with which these themes were recalled may have little to do with employees' awareness of campaign content. Mention of these items may be due to an awareness that employees' reasons for their vote. It was unnecessary for an employee to report any details of a campaign issue to be credited with having recalled that issue. See note 23 supra and accompanying text.
46. For an explanation of how the CFI and UFI indexes were constructed, see id. 47. The low level of campaign familiarity was not due to a substantial time lag between the end of the campaign and the wave II interview. Eighty-four percent (1o59 out of 1264) of all wave II interviews took place within 2 days after the election and 92% (1163 out of 1264) within 4 days. The correlation between the number of days after the election the wave Il interview took place and CFI was -. 05 and the correlation with UPI was .o2, neither of which is statistically significant.
48. Voters in political elections have been found similarly inattentive to the campaign. Only 16% of the voters in the 1948 Presidential election knew the correct stands of both candidates on two major issues of the campaign. Over a third knew only one stand correctly or none at all. B. BER.LSONz, P. LAzAass'aLD & V. McPHEE, supra note 17, at 227.
49. It should be apparent that the percentage of employees recognizing particular issues as defined by our code categories depended to some extent on the breadth of the categories. The broader the categories, the greater the number of employee responses that were likely to be counted within each one and the higher the campaign familiarity index was likely to be for that issue. In order to maximize the measurement of employees' familiarity with campaign issues, we chose to make the categories as broad as the actual campaign messages reasonably permitted. This methodological issue is treated more fully in our final report soon to be published. unions typically claim the ability to improve wages and ensure fair treatment, themes which correspond to opinions already held by many employees prior to the campaign. Recall of other themes was substantially lower, with only one other issue-the union will improve working conditions generally (issue 3)-reported by more than 30 percent of the voters.
In order to test whether important issues are recalled in precise detail, we asked about union campaign statements concerning wages obtained elsewhere. Such statements are central to many campaigns and when deemed significantly inaccurate have been the basis for setting aside elections. The Board has stated that wages obtained elsewhere are "a subject of utmost concern to the employees.""°I n 22 of the elections studied, the union campaign included a statement about wages it had obtained elsewhere' Employees in each of those elections were asked if the union had made such a statement. Only 50 percent (367 out of 733) were aware that it had. Only 22 percent were able to recall the amount of the claim within io percent 5 2 Moreover, precision of recall was unrelated to vote. There were no more union voters among those who recalled the union's wage claims within io percent than among those whose recall was not within io percent or those who remembered that the union had made wage claims, but had no recollection of the amount of the claim.
C. The Campaign's Effect on Switchers and Undecided Voters
While the great majority of the employees voted in accord with their precampaign intent, approximately 13 percent voted contrary to their ori-50. See, e.g., Western Health Facilities, Inc., 2o8 N.L.R.B. 56 (1974). The courts also regard assertions about wages as crucial to the voting decision. See, e.g., notes 8 & 9 supra. 51. None of these statements was challenged before the Board as being inaccurate; nor did we have access to data that would determine their accuracy.
52. Any employee response arguably accurate within io% was so categorized. In two elections, for example, the union published salary ranges for a number of different job classifications; a response within io% of any range was coded as accurate. ginal intent and 6 percent were undecided about which way to vote at wave L" These two groups were few in number, both within and across all elections, but their votes were sufficiently numerous to determine the outcome of nine elections. If these employees were highly attentive to the campaign of the party for which they ultimately voted, this fact would be some indication that they relied on that campaign in reaching their vote decision.
i. The findings. Table 8 shows that employees who switched from a company intent to a union vote did report significantly more about the union campaign than employees whose company intent remained firm through vote (r -.J9). Those who switched from a union intent to a company vote were not, however, significantly more familiar with the company campaign than those whose union intent held firm (r = -. 02). There was thus no evidence that familiarity with the content of the company campaign was associated with switching to the company.
Those employees who were undecided about which way to vote at wave I followed the same pattern as the switchers. Although Table 9 shows that the undecided who voted pro-union were significantly more familiar with the union campaign than those who voted pro-company (r = -34), .34
See
.01
* These figures represent the average percent of campaign issues recalled by the employees in the sample as recorded in their UFI and CFL those who voted pro-company were no more familiar with the company campaign than those who voted pro-union (r = -. m)."
Even if familiarity with the union's campaign influences some employees who are initially undecided or intend to vote company to switch (and indeed switch may precede exposure and familiarity), the influence is not strong. Neither the undecided nor the switchers were very familiar with the campaign of either party. Those who voted pro-union were no more familiar with the union campaign than those who intended to vote pro-union and did; those who voted pro-company were no more familiar with the company campaign than those who intended to vote pro-company and did." Furthermore, a substantial majority of both switchers (76 percent) and undecided (68 percent) voted company." Since there were so few switchers and undecided, this means that less than 5 percent of the total sample either switched to the union or were originally undecided and ultimately voted pro-union. The content of the union campaign may be influencing some employees, but not enough to make a difference in many elections."
IV. CONCLUSION
Board decisions setting aside elections because the winning party has engaged in a misrepresentation of fact or law are based on the assumption 54. The apparent reason why the switchers and the undecided who vote pro-union know significantly more about the union campaign than those who vote consistent with their pro-company intent is that the former attend union meetings more frequently.
55. These data are entirely consistent with the political voter studies that show the switchers and the undecided to be less attentive to political communications than those voters who make early and firm vote decisions. See, e.g., P. LAZAISFELD, B. BERELsoN & H. GAUDET, supra note 17, at 56, 59. See also Part I, supra note io, at 1486-87. Table 3 supra. 57. All analyses described in this section were performed also on those employees who voted [Vol. 28: Page 263 that employees attend closely to the campaign and that their vote is likely to be influenced by campaign assertions. The data, however, indicate that employees are not generally attentive to the campaign. Even union claims as to wages obtained elsewhere are remembered with reasonable accuracy by fewer than 25 percent of the employees. More importantly, there is little evidence that the precise details of campaign propaganda play a substantial role in influencing vote. Slightly more than 8o percent of the sample voted as they had planned prior to the campaign. 58 Even those who switched displayed little familiarity with the campaign of the party for which they ultimately voted. Switching to the union was related to familiarity with the union campaign, but such switching occurs so rarely that it is hardly ever likely to affect the election outcome.
See
It makes little sense for the Board to set aside election results in many cases in the hope of protecting free choice in a few. The likelihood that campaign misrepresentations will affect outcome is so slim that continued application of the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine is more likely to frustrate free choice than to protect it.
The Board has no means by which to identify those few cases in which a campaign misrepresentation might affect outcome. It could hardly assess the impact of misrepresentations in individual cases by questioning employees as to how they voted and why. An employee's assertion that he voted in favor of union representation because of a campaign misrepresentation would be highly suspect. Unless the Board knew that the employee was undecided or planned to vote against the union prior to the time the misrepresentation was made, it could not possibly conclude that misrepresentation caused him to vote pro-union. However, questioning by government agents before and after each election as to how employees planned to vote, did vote and why would be both impracticable and inconsistent with the statutory requirement of a secret ballot.
The possibility that continued regulation may in some cases prevent employees from being influenced by a misrepresentation must also be weighed against the costs of regulation. The fact that misleading or deceptive statements might constitute grounds for setting aside an election provides a tempting basis upon which the losing side may file objections, thus contributing to the Board's already staggering caseload." This, in differently than their attitudes or card-signing behavior predicted. In no case were the results different from those found for the undecided and the switchers.
58. The stability of employees' attitudes and intent as predictors of vote has implications beyond the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine and the assumptions on which it is based. See notes 13 & 14 supra. For example, these findings are inconsistent with the assumption that employees are unsophisticated about labor relations and therefore easily swayed by campaign assertions. See Part I, supra note io, at 1473-75. 59 . In fiscal year 1974, the NLRB received a record number of 42,373 cases, exceeding the turn, has been said to lower the quality of the Board's decisions and impair its ability to enforce the Act."' The delay involved in resolving objections also frustrates the statutory policy of promptly determining whether or not employees wish union representation.
Accordingly, we recommend that the Board overrule Hollywood Ceramics and refuse in the future to set aside elections in which the winner is alleged to have engaged in a misrepresentation of fact or law.
41,077 cases received in fiscal 1973, the previous high point. 39 NLRB ANt. REP. 1 (1974) . Objections were filed in x,iii of 9,I2 elections. Id. at 2I8-I9.
6o. See Bok, supra note 3, at 6o-6i; Sarnofi, supra note 3, at 278-79; R. Wn.ums, P. JtAus & K. HuHm, supra note 9, at 438.
